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“But every metaphor that life shatters implies a loss of hu-
man freedom. For freedom can exist only so long as fi ctions 
and metaphors are stronger than crude reality, and thus up-
hold our dignity. In fact every shattered metaphor is nothing 
but the fl ag of human freedom trodden into the dust--in this 
case red and white.”1 
1The problem of whether public housing projects in Vienna were located and 
designed with military considerations in mind will not go away. The scorn 
of Ursula Prokop2 at the idea that the complex at Friedrich-Engels-Platz 
contained any military intent based on studying Rudolf Perco’s designs and 
notes, for example, can be found earlier in stronger language when the 
Hautmann brothers register “Homeric laughter” at similar thoughts.3
Anson Rabinbach is suspicious when he looks at the military possibilities to 
be found in pools, gardens, playgrounds and the like, but later in the same 
work he expresses certainty without, however, providing any evidence, 
“There can be no doubt that the houses were built with a military purpose 
in mind, as structures to be defended with force…”4 Generally accepted 
views, though, seem to follow Kurt Peball with his cool and sober dismissal 
of the notion for lack of documentary evidence.5 It is hard to disagree with 
one part of Peball’s argument that at least some of the 370 or so projects 
found themselves of necessity at strategic locations near bridges, major 
intersections, army bases, railroad terminals and the like due to sheer 
numbers. The accidental nature of the locations reinforces the lack of ev-
idence to become something approaching received wisdom. Contempo-
raries said simply that the plans were there for all to see when they were 
posted in City Hall and that it was impossible to include secret passages 
and the like because the buildings were mostly designed by private ar-
chitects and fi rms.* On the other hand, Josef Schneider published a tract 
shortly after the brief civil war in 1934 on the “Fall of the Red Fortress,” as 
he called the Karl-Marx-Hof, the location where the city government has 
chosen to commemorate the uprising in a special way, and he listed the 
military characteristics of the housing projects in general terms easily dis-
missed for lack of details. Somehow, however, the history of contemporary 
accusations starting well before the Karl-Marx-Hof was built that the city 
was building “Kasernen” or military bases echoes today not just because 
they were voiced consistently in the press and the City Council by Chris-
tian Socials but because the buildings, Objekte in German, are still there 
and can be studied in relation to their surroundings and the cityscape as a 
whole, that is the Stadtbild of Vienna, which had long been of concern to 
city planners. In the process, the unique qualities of these projects, found 
in every part of town except the First District inside the Ring, often take 
on a military cast suggesting that the politics of confrontation between the 
federal government and the socialists were being expressed in architectur-
al form, at fi rst perhaps as metaphor and then as reality when the social-
ists felt pushed to the extreme of actual armed uprising that turned quickly 
and almost exclusively into defense of the housing projects against a coun-
terattack by the government. In other words the metaphor of the fortress 
became the reality when confronted with the crude actuality of increas-
* Karl Weigl, ranking Social Democrat who held several posts in testimony after February, 1934. 
Allgemeines Verwaltungs Archiv (AVA) Polizeidirektion Wien, Akten Feb. 1934 Karton 1 Zl. Pr. IV 
2606/1934. 
2ing political confrontation that ended in armed revolt.* Not only were the 
Social Democrats aware of the accusations, they added to the rhetoric by 
conceding that the projects could be thought of as fortresses of the people. 
Otto Glöckel, head of the Vienna schools, said at the torchlight parade on 
the evening before the opening of the Karl Marx Hof, “Earlier, palaces and 
castles were built for the oppressors of the people, castles of the nobility 
and the knights; today castles of the people arise. This building is for us 
a symbol; on its forehead it bears the name of the immortal spirit of Karl 
Marx. In his name we have built a new fortress of rent protection…”6
Commentary on the housing program of the Social Democrats until now 
has come mostly from architectural historians using esthetic and sociologi-
cal categories. On occasion it stretches logic, as for example in a biograph-
ical sketch of Karl Ehn, architect of the Karl-Marx-Hof. “Beyond that, the 
complex received sad notoriety through the bloody struggles of the civil 
war fought there in February, 1934, as at an array of other city housing 
projects, which showed through the rapid defeat of the workers’ uprising 
that the martial appearance of the housing complex was only metaphori-
cal and in no way met real strategic requirements.”† Similar thinking can 
be found in Ursula Prokop’s biography of Rudolf Perco, although she rec-
ognizes a problem with considering the massive complex at Friedrich-En-
gels-Platz merely as a metaphor.‡ Eve Blau concurs more or less.7 Franz 
Kaym, himself deeply involved in providing designs suitable for defense 
as shown in the settlement on Weissenböckstrasse, wrote, “some of these 
* Commentators over the years have addressed the question. Gerhard Kapner, for example, in 
“Der Wiener .kommunale Wohnbau: Urteile der Zwischen- u. Nachkriegszeit” in Franz Kadrnoska, 
Aufbruch und Untergang: Ös. Kultur zw. 1918 u. 1938, (Wien, 1981), 149-159, cites Jörg Mauthe 
“Der phantastische Gemeindebau” in Alte u. moderne Kunst, Wien, 1961 #44 S 17 ff. ( p. 149) who 
contends that the larger Gemeindebauten were not designed as functional fortresses but as sym-
bols, an esthetic category of revolutionary architecture that did not serve a revolution at all but was 
merely a style. Kapner fi nds support from Rainer Bauböck and the art historians Peter Haiko and 
Mara Reissberger. All argue improperly backwards from failure in 1934 to the symbolic nature of the 
architecture instead of forward from the symbolic nature of the architecture to their transformation 
into actual fortresses as the political mistakes of the Social Democrats multiplied. Their argument 
makes the members of Magistrats Amt (MA) 22 more involved with the esthetics of what they were 
building than documentary evidence warrants despite the presence of many architects in an offi ce 
of more than 70 employees. There is scarcely any concern for politics or ideology in their analysis. 
The argument must be made rather on the basis of the buildings themselves and the Stadtbild into 
which they were placed between the wars.
† “Darüber hinaus erlangte die Anlage traurige Berühmtheit durch die blutigen Bürgerkriegskämpfe, 
die im Februar 1934 dort, wie auch in einer Reihe von anderen Gemeindebauanlagen, ausgefochten 
wurden und durch die rasche Niederschlagung des Arbeiteraufstands erwies sich, dass das mar-
tialische Erscheinungsbild des Wohnblocks nur metaphorisch war und keineswegs realen strate-
gischen Anforderungen entsprach.” Architektenlexikon 1880-1945 of the Architekturzentrum Wiens, 
entry on Karl Ehn. Online. Using the same logic Fort Ticonderoga could be considered a metaphori-
cal fortress because it fell in a matter of minutes during the American Revolution.
‡ Prokop, 182-83 “Allerdings kamen die Kampfhandlungen, wie überall anders auch, sehr schnell 
zum Erliegen, was dem Vorwurf einer Konzeption der Anlage nach verteidigungstechnischen Ge-
sichtspunkten Hohn spricht.”
“Bei aller Problematik und Vieldeutigkeit der Metaphorik der Anlage: nichts stand dem planenden 
Architekten ferner als reelle strategische Überlegungen, wie die im Skizzenbuch Percos erhaltenen
vielfältigen Überlegungen zur Grundrißstrukturierung der Anlage beweisen.” 
3gigantic buildings can be compared to fortresses (Zwingburgen),” and 
joins the chorus of opponents by adding, “The largest of these party bases 
(Parteikasernen), with 2,400 apartments, went to Perco.”* The revolution-
ary political conditions of the decade have been passed over by historians 
of the housing program in favor of an approach that treats the politics of 
the First Republic as though Austria at the time was a republic with consti-
tutional government acceptable to all, not unlike the United States. Rather, 
the normal state of affairs during this time can be regarded as closer to 
protracted revolutionary class struggle and counterrevolution than busi-
ness as usual. The politics of the housing program and the buildings them-
selves, in other words, have been treated apart from broader political con-
siderations and the impact of those conditions on the architecture of the 
buildings as though the intentions of the socialists were restricted solely to 
providing public housing and securing votes for doing so. 
The purpose of this article is to raise the question again in a modest form 
by pointing to three relatively small buildings built between 1925 and 1928 
at the same time the mammoth Karl-Marx-Hof was being planned and 
built and relating them to the Stadtbild, infl uenced by the politics of the 
time. Many projects earlier and later were admitted even by socialists to 
be “powerful,” “dominating” and “monumental.” The locations might have 
been strategic by accident but the choices planners and architects made 
for buildings on the sites were fully informed by concerns about the impact 
they would have on the Stadtbild. Josef Bittner8, clearly aware of compet-
ing with a bygone culture, defends the monumentality of one apartment 
block because of its proximity to the Gloriette at Schönbrunn†, Peball’s 
argument loses force when the sites he shrugs off as strategic by accident 
received buildings that look like bunkers, with features useful in the event 
of urban warfare. City offi cials who had in the past been greatly concerned 
with the cityscape were not suddenly unaware that the buildings they were 
erecting looked threatening. It must be stressed that they were as clear 
as before about how their buildings fi t into the Stadtbild with precedents 
from imperial times and World War I in the recent past. I will present an 
argument that the metaphors of power and domination became the real-
ity of fortresses by 1934, regarded as such by both the government and 
the rebels and that many features of the buildings can be regarded by the 
historian today as militarily useful at the time despite the lack of evidence 
in surviving documents to corroborate observations. As examples prolifer-
ate the obvious suggestion emerges that planners had military purposes 
in mind, intentions that they could not articulate under the circumstanc-
es. The buildings are all still there and invite viewing as they await further 
study in relation to the year they were conceived, acquisition of the land, 
designs for the sites and changes in approach by offi cials in the City Build-
* Franz Kaym, testimonial to Rudolf Perco in Stadt u. Landesarchiv, Nachlass Perco Karton 1-1 Biog-
raphisches Material, p. 19
† The architect was Eric Leischner of MA 22, so the design was entirely the responsibility of the 
Stadtbauamt.
4ing Offi ce (the Stadtbauamt) over the decade, perhaps in response to po-
litical events, fi nancial considerations or both. The “Gemeinde Wien type” 
of buildings described thoughtfully by Eve Blau should be expanded in the 
process to include military characteristics in keeping with their outward 
appearance, their place in the Stadtbild and the politics of the years they 
were built with the constant possibility of violent confrontation. Until now, 
military considerations have been largely rejected with strong rhetoric, but 
the unique qualities of the housing projects, seen nowhere else in Europe, 
and their place in the cityscape call attention to themselves despite a lack 
of documentary evidence in city fi les. A clear implication is that if martial 
intent existed and was not culled from the documents by interested parties 
it was buried in the hearts of city offi cials and communicated to partici-
pating architects by suggestion and implication following models present-
ed by the city. Franz Kaym, testifi ed to the devious nature of the rhetoric 
surrounding the building program when he wrote that the city concealed 
its need for architects of all “shades” with “lovely, propagandistic words.”* 
This possibility will be explored as part of a discussion about the way con-
tracts were distributed. 
One major reason to be mentioned immediately for keeping military in-
tentions sub rosa was the dependence of Vienna on subventions from the 
federal government. That revenue would have been jeopardized immedi-
ately by clear evidence that the housing projects were intended as part of 
the class struggle, for it became clear in the course of the decade, no later 
than the riots of 1927, that the conservative federal government would be 
the likely opponent of Red Vienna in the event of a civil war. The famous 
housing tax (Wohnbausteuer) instituted by the city and proclaimed in large 
red letters on many of the projects ignored for the most part the debt 
owed to the federal government for aid.
The Documents
A large problem dealing with politics and the Gemeindebauten is the lack 
of documentation available to the researcher. City government was divided 
into administrative divisions, summarized well by Eve Blau. The division 
entrusted with the planning and execution of the building program was 
Magistrats-Abteilung (MA), 22, the department of the City Building Offi ce 
or Stadtbauamt that did most of the technical work of acquiring sites, set-
ting guidelines, choosing architects, and approving designs, but approval 
moved through other departments, MA 24 for example, led by Josef Bittner 
starting in 1926, which mediated between MA 22 and the politicians in the 
City Council where the head of the Housing Authority (Wohnungswesen) 
* Franz Kaym, ibid. He includes an interesting judgment of Rudolf Perco, the architect of Engel-
splatz. “He (Perco) experienced a brief, illusory period of prosperity (Scheinblüte) as an architect 
engaged in building when Social Democratic Vienna implemented its housing program and was 
forced to engage architects of every shade (in jeder Schattierung). Certainly the pressure was not 
acknowledged but was concealed through lovely, propagandistic forms of speaking (Redensarten).”
5was the titanic Social Democratic politician Anton Weber.* A solid majority 
of Social Democrats in the City Council ensured that plans moving up the 
line in bureaucratic fashion would receive approval and needed funding 
without further delay.
One can say with confi dence that there is no documentary evidence avail-
able in the archives of the Stadtbauamt to show that its offi cials expressed 
any interest in military matters or that they associated with members of 
the socialist paramilitary organization. Furthermore there is no evidence 
that accusations about the military features of the Gemeindebauten from 
outside the Stadtbauamt coming from the conservative press or voiced in 
sessions of the City Council for example, received internal responses or 
were included on the agenda for meetings of different departments. The 
absence of documentary evidence has blocked attempts to claim that any 
aspect of the program dealt with the possibility of using the buildings in 
the event of armed confl ict between residents who might be members of 
the socialist paramilitary militia and opposing paramilitary groups, the po-
lice or the federal government. In other words, there is no clear evidence 
that the Stadtbauamt directly intended to include features in the buildings 
meant to store weapons, to deter opponents who might want to occupy 
them by force, to provide fi ring positions or avenues of communication and 
escape. One purpose of this article is to dissuade future researchers from 
trying to fi nd a link in surviving documents. To that end extensive notes on 
the activities of the Stadtbauamt between 1919 and 1941 have been in-
cluded in an internet link for use by researchers in whatever way they see 
fi t.†
The documents, however, contain some circumstantial evidence to tie the 
program to political or military goals. Laws on eminent domain were weak, 
which forced the city to buy land on the open market. Some records in the 
fi les contain widely varying prices paid for pieces of property. The question 
of buying property at all when the city owned huge tracts of land should be 
* At the opening of the Karl Marx Hof on October 12, 1930 Mayor Karl Seitz singled out Anton We-
ber, to great applause, and Josef Bittner for the form of the building as well as mentioning the ar-
chitecht Karl Ehn. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 13 Oktober, 1930. For insight into Anton Weber’s personality 
see the transcript of his trial after the civil war cited below (footnote 40) where he unapologetically 
and proudly, even defi antly, declared his dedication to the Social Democrats. It is harder to judge 
Josef Bittner, an engineer and architect who wrote a series of articles for the Arbeiter-Zeitung in 
1926 when new apartment blocks were opening regularly but stopped abruptly when he was named 
head of MA 24 on May 31, 1926. He then rode herd over a diverse group of architects to maintain 
commendable order in the program. He stayed on through the Ständestaat until the Nazis arrived 
but was denounced anonymously soon after. Earnest letters of recommendation could not save 
his job and he was eventually dismissed. Cf. BD 1256/38 letter, April 4, 1938 from A. (Aufmuth?) 
writing for the Stadtbaudirektor to Palme, Director of Personnel. By this time Bittner had become a 
Senate Counselor (Senatsrat). He was still in offi ce in March, 1939 but thereafter disappears from 
the records.
† The author is indebted to Fr. Dr. Brigitte Rigele of MA 8 for facilitating access to the depot, in the 
Kandlgasse at the time, and now to be found at Gasometer City. Notes on the documents can be 
found on Google at Documents of Baudirektion Wien 1919-1941: Notes of Michael J. Zeps, S.J. They 
are published and made available in e-Publications@Marquette.
6raised eventually in connection with acquiring strategic sites. Unsuccessful 
efforts by the city to acquire land at the Stadtlau bridgehead, for example, 
require more research.* It is safe to say that some of the highest prices 
were paid for strategically important locations.† 
Likewise, minutes of committee meetings of different divisions in the 
Stadtbauamt are not to be found, only the conclusions contained in letters 
addressed to other departments. Individual districts had committees on 
public housing as well, but no proceedings or minutes of meetings appear 
to have survived. Internal discussions about aspects of the program are 
consequently absent from the record as individuals who took one side or 
another on a point under discussion are shielded from view. The result is a 
certain impersonal, determinate and mechanical quality about activities as 
though human agents were missing from the process. Decisions are re-
corded without identifying those responsible. Until now few personal pa-
pers have come to light to reveal much of anything about the inner work-
ings of the Stadtbauamt. 
One of the features that the Gemeindebauten included were the small 
toilet windows that political opponents complained about when they called 
the buildings military barracks. This is a notable feature of many buildings 
such that it should be included in a general description of the Gemeinde 
Wien type from c. 1925 to 1930. They were not part of the published 
guidelines nor is there a record when they were introduced, but they af-
fected the Stadtbild and generated apprehension as potential fi ring loca-
tions. 
The Politics of the Housing Program
The politics of the Social Democratic public housing program treated in 
much of the literature ends at the doors of the City Council or Gemein-
derat. The City Council with Anton Weber in charge of housing embarked 
on a program of building fi rst 25,000 apartments, then quickly another 
25,000, delegating the Stadtbauamt to implement the program. Discus-
sion of the politics of the program is confi ned mostly to the mechanics of 
achieving the goal, that is through taxation policies, decisions made in the 
City Council regarding sites, architectural designs and money for projects 
as though party politics did not affect the internal workings of MA 22 or 
* The city owned 8790 hectares out of a total of 27,806 ha. in 1925. Cf. Ohne Zahl 1925 following 
Baudirektion Wien (BD) 3436/1925. It made repeated attempts to acquire property at the Stadtlau 
railroad bridge over the Danube starting in 1917. BD 1942/1924.
† There is an interesting case of property bought from Bernhard Kessler in 1929 at the junction 
of Linke Wienzeile, Gumpendorfergürtel and Margaretengürtel before the extension of the Linke 
Wienzeile, that is at the end of the Linke Wienzeile. The city paid S46.5/m2 for one portion and 
an astronomical S64.5/m2 for another. A wasteland for a long time because Kessler sold it under-
standing that it would be used for recreation and somehow was able to block an apartment complex 
announced immediately for the site, it has now become an open but otherwise barren green space 
surrounded by heavily travelled arterials. Cf. BD 2499/29, BD 2691/29 and BD 2975/29. All the 
same, the Leuthnerhof dominates the junction.
7the rest of the Baudirektion. There is evidence to indicate that communi-
cations between Anton Weber and the offi cials of the City Building Offi ce 
were close, and without a doubt the Stadtbauamt was a politically reliable 
instrument to implement details of the ambitious program within the time 
frame set by the Gemeinderat.* Vienna had no planning commission led 
by an architect as in Berlin or Frankfurt, a situation that enhanced the 
place of politicians like Anton Weber, exposed the housing program to pol-
itics, and opened the program to designs that served political rather than 
purely social or aesthetic ends. While granting the importance of politics 
in the housing program of Vienna, however, Eve Blau and others are re-
luctant to extend politics to its proper limit which, as Clausewitz insists, 
is war. She writes, “In Vienna, politicians rather than design and planning 
professionals were in charge,” without considering that Social Democratic 
politicians were Marxists leading workers in a class struggle and were us-
ing the Stadtbauamt to implement broader socialist policies without ac-
knowledging the goal of capturing the state by force if necessary following 
the model of the Russian Revolution.9 At the point of approval and delega-
tion to the Stadtbauamt complex relationships ensued between public and 
private sectors dealing with acquiring land and hiring private architects 
because the program was simply too large for the architects on the staff 
of the Stadtbauamt. This article will leave for another time discussing the 
relative costs of developing infrastructure for housing on the large tracts 
of city-owned land compared with buying property on the open market in 
neighborhoods already served by water and sewers to concentrate on the 
buildings and architects themselves. Certain buildings designed by city 
architects or fi rms known to be close to city bureaus became models to 
be imitated by architects who wanted to be included in the program. In 
other words, beyond the specifi c published guidelines for individual apart-
ments--dimensions, plumbing, ventilation and the like--private architects 
could see examples to be imitated if they wanted to be included, get an-
other contract or possibly a larger contract the next time around. The 
astonishing informality involved in choosing architects has been passed 
over lightly, or even facetiously, by commentators resigned to the lack of 
documentation, but it takes on great weight in assessing the politics of the 
housing program at the level of implementation as well as the shape of the 
buildings that resulted as the decade proceeded.† 
Whatever the provenance of the Gemeindebauten, the results were widely 
seen by the conservative opposition as threatening. Private building had all 
but ceased by the mid-1920’s and landlords were resigned to losing ten-
ants, but a new threat to the physical control of the federal government 
* In 1925, for example, Weber requested better telephone connections between City Hall and the 
Housing Offi ce. BD 4155/1925. Accusations made in the Gemeinderat along with Weber’s denial of 
political intent can be found in Peball, 55. Gemeinderat Schiener explicitly objected to the toilet win-
dows in the meeting on December 19, 1927 when Weber was also defending the choice of ground 
for the Karl-Marx-Hof as based on technical considerations.
† Controlling costs in the early and middle years of the program was less important than getting the 
buildings built and will be passed over in this article except for the case of Marinelligasse 1.
8over the city appeared when hundreds of new buildings in confi gurations 
interpreted visually as threatening became fi lled with socialist sympathiz-
ers.* The buildings eventually became the repositories of weapons with-
held from the victorious Allies after World War I by mutual agreement 
among the parties at the time but controlled within a few years by the So-
cial Democratic party by virtue of controlling the Arsenal where they were 
stored. The Social Democrats, then, not the army or the police, had access 
to the weapons, which included thousands of rifl es, machineguns and am-
munition. The list did not include artillery, however.
It should be noted that the police were an arm of the federal government 
rather than a branch of city government.† The result at least as early as 
1927 was that the Social Democrats and the police eyed each other sus-
piciously as a socialist paramilitary militia grew within the city for defense 
of the republic against a right wing coup. Big questions about relations 
between the two arose during and after the riots of 1927 until trust broke 
down completely by 1931. The Gemeindebauten became a focus of atten-
tion no later than that time when the police requested the designs of fu-
ture housing projects saying they needed them for voting lists. The Stadt-
bauamt rejected the request out of hand saying that there was a simple 
alternative for creating a register.‡ 
To ignore the possibility of civil war in Austria with Vienna as its center in 
dealing with the politics of the building program draws attention to the 
staid and unimaginative leadership of the Social Democrats during the First 
Republic. Without doubt they were loyal to the Republic, but the example 
of Bolshevik success in Russia destabilized an evolving orientation toward 
orderly parliamentary government among socialists to create tension be-
tween the doctrine of the revolutionary class struggle and the republican 
politics of Karl Renner, Karl Seitz and others who were trying to build on 
the democratic principles outlined in the constitution of 1920. Otto Bauer, 
the party theoretician, did not help to resolve the dilemma with his incon-
gruous mixture of Marxist ideological purity, nationalism and support for 
unifi cation with Germany, which he maintained even after Hitler marched 
in. Politicians tried to run city government democratically, using peaceful 
constitutional methods while ignoring the ferment of revolution welling up 
from below and the possibility of large scale violence. Ilona Duczynska has 
investigated this well in her biography of Theodor Körner noting his prob-
lems with Social Democratic leaders as he tried to organize the “technical” 
aspects of the socialist paramilitary Republikanischer Schutzbund, which 
meant weaponry more than anything else. Duczynska argues with Trotsky-
* An example of the complaints can be found in the Protokoll of the Gemeinderat meeting of May 
27, 1927 with Leopold Kunschak, head of the Christian trade unions speaking. P. 2360.
† A suggestion shortly after World War I was that Vienna become a capital city like Washington, 
D.C., but with nearly one-third of the entire population of the country the proposal went nowhere.
‡ BD 3266/31 letter of June 12, 1931 and response. The city answered that it could not comply and 
would instead send forms indicating approval to use the apartments (Benützungsbewilligung).
9ite confi dence in the revolutionary elan of the Viennese workers that they 
deserved better political leaders. Körner, a retired general and future Pres-
ident of the Second Republic, found himself increasingly isolated from the 
political leadership since the mid-1920’s. He resigned in spring, 1930, 
failing six months later in a last ditch effort to wrest operational leadership 
of the Schutzbund from the incompetent Julius Deutsch.* Matters wors-
ened for the socialists between 1927 and 1934 when the federal police 
became militarized, the right wing paramilitary Heimwehr grew, the new 
Nazi movement added an unsettling element, and weapons were distrib-
uted to socialist fi ghters in the Gemeindebauten apparently without much 
central control.† Rigorous training ensured that the army would be loyal to 
the government making socialist sympathies among soldiers as in 1918 a 
thing of the past. 
The building program of Vienna was not immune to involvement in rev-
olutionary politics. That is to say it did not appear in a political vacuum 
having nothing to do with the possibility of violence, a relation that needs 
to be studied using more tools than the documents of the Stadtbauamt. 
The architecture of Red Vienna evolved from deliberate, even impractical 
monumentality through militarily useful features and back to a more func-
tional form of the monumental during the time.‡ Helmut Weihsmann in his 
excellent Das Rote Wien10 sees three periods in the program but does not 
admit that buildings built during the second stage contained overtly mili-
tary features. Eventually the formidable and fortress-like qualities of the 
housing projects from all three periods led the workers to regard them as 
an extensive array of defensible military installations quite apart from any 
offensive military operations that would be needed to take control of the 
government in a civil war. A plan outlined by Alexander Eifl er after The-
odor Körner resigned included using them for defense even as he recog-
nized the need to take the offensive. The plan was to attack and defeat the 
armed forces of the government and its auxiliaries in order to occupy the 
city and capture the state, whether or not the subsequent form of gov-
ernment would be a republic or a dictatorship of the proletariat. Without 
much surviving documentation, one can point all the same to a succession 
of buildings put up between 1924 and 1928 that have military attributes, 
located at sites where those features could be put to optimum use in the 
event of an armed confrontation. 
* Letter of Körner to Bauer, September 26, 1930 found in AVA 1934 Karton 1 quoted in Ilona 
Duczynska, Der demokratische Bolschewik: Zur Theorie und Praxis der Gewalt, (München, 1975), 
338-339. Manfred Tafuri has also explored this line of thinking.
† Doderer in his novel seems to waffl e on the time when the police became militarized. Cf. p. 987 
and 1261 where he makes the riots of 1927 the turning point but already has the police marching 
in step with rifl es and fi ring salvos. The trials of 1934 failed to uncover clear leads on the origins, 
numbers and responsibility for weapons prior to the uprising. While the defense understandably 
pleaded ignorance and the prosecution was half-hearted, it is hard to ignore an impression of confu-
sion and indecision among socialist political and military personnel.
‡ The postwar predilection for settlements was reduced to insignifi cance by 1926 and will not be a 
consideration although one of the housing complexes discussed here was attached to a settlement.
10
I also argue that a reaction in favor of more functional forms of monumen-
tal architecture, Weihsmann’s third stage, began before the Karl-Marx-Hof 
was completed, perhaps even begun, for there is evidence that this icon of 
Red Vienna took on a life of its own as early as 1924. The military features 
of the second period together with continued monumentality of the third 
period reached gargantuan proportions at Friedrich-Engels-Platz near the 
Floridsdorf Bridge and became a temptation to rely on the defensive capa-
bilities of masonry and steel proven in World War I and being reaffi rmed 
at the moment in France with the Maginot Line starting in 1930. The se-
duction was complete in 1932 with the opening of Friedrich-Engels-Platz, 
involving even the Arbeiter-Zeitung. (Figure 1) Sixty thousand apartments 
spread throughout the city and fi lled with socialist supporters were enough 
to defeat even heavily armed military units, it seemed. This hope was 
based on the probability that the government was incapable of reducing 
350 installations containing arms and fi ghters with the small forces avail-
able to it under the Treaty of St. Germain. It remained to link the buildings 
together to secure the city, the point at which the rebellion failed. 
From Metaphor to Reality
The atmosphere of impending violence in Vienna is described in The De-
mons, a Proustian novel by Heimito von Doderer that culminates in the 
events of July, 1927 when rioters burned the Palace of Justice and 89 peo-
ple lost their lives with around 1000 wounded, mostly at the hands of the 
federal police. In fairness, he notes the transition from metaphor to reality 
in the passage quoted at the beginning apparently without being aware 
that the idea might be applied to the public housing projects.*
The Gemeindebauten were described as “monumental” and as “power-
ful” from early in the program. Without doubt the term “monumental” is 
metaphorical, a building presented to the eye for admiration, standing for 
Social Democratic concern for the welfare of the workers as part of the 
Social Democratic agenda for Vienna. The image is literary and poetic, for 
the real purpose of the buildings was to provide housing, of course. An-
other word used almost as often is “powerful,” stretching the metaphor in 
the direction of military usefulness. Applied to these buildings it describes 
a type of building characteristic of Vienna and almost nowhere else during 
the interwar period.† Housing projects are not usually seen as “powerful,” 
* The Hungarian diplomat Giza von Orkay, says in disgust, “Here the ground is hot underfoot,” as 
he condemns both the perpetrators of the shooting at Schattendorf—the inciting incident-- and 
those who seek to exploit the acquittals to further the class struggle. (pp. 975-976). The novel, not 
published until 1956, is cited here to illustrate the undercurrent of violence rather than to suggest 
that Doderer saw the Gemeindebauten as part of a grand scheme to take over the government. A 
few pages earlier he has the narrator Geyrenhoff noting how “antiquated and grubby quarters” were 
being abandoned for the Gemeindebauten in an “incessant and imperceptible migration” (p. 965). 
I am indebted to the military historian Gordon A. Craig for the reference to Doderer as well as the 
observation that the Gemeindebauten were “provocative.”
† Bruno Taut and Walter Gropius used some similar features in Karl-Legien-Stadt and Siemensstadt 
respectively.
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but those in Vienna were and continue to be described as such in the liter-
ature. The metaphor is an attractive literary fi gure to describe the artistic 
qualities of the buildings, but during the time they were built the meta-
phor confronted the reality of social division with the possibility of armed 
confl ict between approximately equal armed groups that put the outcome 
of a civil war in doubt. The metaphor of power became the reality of the 
fortress. The term these days is used by commentators exclusively in the 
Figure 1. Picture from Arbeiter-Zeitung of March 6, 1932 where photos of 
Heimwehr military exercises are placed opposite the new apartment com-
plex at Friedrich-Engels-Platz. “Disarmament? Nice! But what is it with these 
weapons that the Heimwehr carries around?” across from, “The Largest of 
all the new Viennese apartment buildings! A Giant of 2200 apartments.”
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metaphorical sense when they refuse to see the apartments as part of the 
political confrontation developing between left and right that led to the civil 
war.* I will extend use of the word here even to smaller buildings to show 
how the type of “powerful” building in Vienna between 1924 and 1929 was 
consistent across a range extending from large to small. 
The “power” of the buildings became a threat to offi cials charged with 
maintaining political control of the city when the government came to 
regard the Gemeindebauten as real fortresses (Festungen), extending the 
metaphor of “barracks” or “military bases” (Kasernen) used by critics on 
the right. The style of the “Gemeinde Wien type” changed over time, but 
the impressions made by emergency housing built to last for 200 years, 
as the Brookings Institution described it, remained up to and through the 
civil war.† The outward appearances of existing buildings along with the 
socialist sentiments of the inhabitants that led to charges of being mili-
tary installations remained even as a more functional form of monumental 
qualities replaced military features. All the same, to ominous earlier build-
ings like the Bebelhof and the Matteottihof were added not only thousands 
of additional apartments in locations that were strategic, deliberately cho-
sen or not, but weapons as well after 1927. Should plans to take over the 
city by attacking fail, the buildings could be used as three hundred or more 
strongpoints to fall back upon, gaining time and spreading the armed forc-
es available to the government exceedingly thin. Piecemeal raids that un-
covered caches of weapons, however, were evidence that the government 
felt threatened enough to take the initiative against a possible uprising and 
led to fears among the socialists that the government might systemati-
cally confi scate enough arms stored in the buildings to ruin their function 
as bases for offensive operations or fall back positions. In the end, the 
perception of the buildings as “powerful” and defensible on one side and a 
threat to public order on the other indicate that they occupied a prominent 
place in the political thinking of both the government and the socialists as 
the civil war approached.‡
* So, for example, the Reumannhof is called “powerful” and “dominating the Gürtel,” “mächtig” and 
“beherrschend die Gürtelstrasse.” BD 1925 Ohne Zahl.following BD 3436/1925 in carton A1-43.
† Charles O. Hardy, The Housing Program of the City of Vienna, (Brookings Institution, 1934), 108. 
“With the funds available the housing shortage could have been relieved more quickly…than by the 
erection of structures which if permitted will stand for two centuries.”
‡ AVA Bundespolizeidirektion Wien, 27 Februar 1934. Report of Dr. Seydel. He lists an arc of build-
ings from the Karl-Marx-Hof reaching across the Danube through the XXI District terminating at 
the Stadtlau railroad bridge, although in fact no building stood at the Stadtlau bridgehead,“wobei 
den Aufständischen in erster Linie der festungsartige Charakter der Wohnhausbauten der Gemeinde 
Wien im hohen Grade zugute kam.” The city had tried to acquire the land at the Stadtlau bridge fi rst 
from the Army, which referred the matter to the Finance Ministry. In 1924 it tried to get the land 
from the Federal Railway as it had with more success with the Hagenwiese where the Karl-Marx-Hof 
stands. Cf. Report of May 27, 1924. BD 1942/1924 from MA 45 found in BD 1942/1924, an un-
signed carbon copy. Seydel’s report benefi ts from hindsight, but the interval between the events of 
1934 and his analysis was a short two weeks. He writes about the projects, as part of a 24 page re-
port, “wie dies der Bundespolizeidirektion seit langem bekannt gewesen war, im strategischen Plan 
der SD Friedensbrecher eine bedeutsame Rolle spielten und ursprünglich offenbar als Operations-
basis f.d. Eroberung der einzelnen Bezirke u.f.d. Beherrschung der nach Wien führenden Bahnlinien 
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The Stadtbild
Otto Wagner, who taught many of the architects involved in the hous-
ing program, insisted that buildings can be regarded in quite contrasting 
ways, with a static point of view from afar that lends itself to interpreting 
a building as a single whole or monumental unit, and from up close with 
an active, ever-changing approach to details as an observer moves from 
different distances and angles toward it, alongside, and into it. The result 
is a “kinesthetic” impression of the building in terms of point and coun-
terpoint.* The perception is more variegated and dynamic the more the 
façade and different parts of the building are articulated and differentiat-
ed. The monumental qualities of the large blocks as well as many smaller 
ones inspire admiration and respect, even awe for the accomplishments of 
the Social Democrats sociologically and architecturally, but they should be 
complemented by a closer investigation in kinesthetic terms of the features 
that could be useful tactically in an armed confrontation with adversaries 
approaching along open streets and exposed places to suppress resis-
tance.† In other words, the constantly changing shape of many buildings 
seen from different distances and angles, approaching them, moving into 
courtyards and into interiors can generate unease and anxiety, a feeling of 
vulnerability, at the thought that many characteristics resemble those of 
military installations and might easily be used to house armed men intent 
on repelling an attack. The long streets of Biedermeier buildings built to 
the zoning limit at the sidewalk and no farther were gone as city offi cials 
departed from the building lines (Baulinien) that had become rigid to the 
point of boredom in the nineteenth century. In their place came streets 
along which buildings were far from fl at, protruding onto and over side-
walks or being set back from the building lines when the city granted it-
self variances to the Baulinien. The new blocks, either fi lling in vacant lots 
(Baulückenverbauung) or standing alone (Randverbauung), became ar-
ticulated with projecting bays, masonry balconies cantilevered toward the 
street, towers that encroached onto and spanned the sidewalk sometimes 
forming tunnels along extended facades, and set back corners that allowed 
observers to see down the street from fi ve or more fl oors up, to name 
a few features that could be considered intimidating or threatening to 
someone imagining, or knowing, that the buildings held men with military 
weapons. The small toilet ventilation windows were especially prominent. 
Buildings like the Matteottihof and Rabenhof included arches that spanned 
gedacht—schliesslich, als sich die hochfl iegenden Pläne nicht verwirklichen liessen, als Stützpunkte 
f.d. Verteidigung der Aufständischen dienten.”
* Eve Blau deals with this in The Architecture of Red Vienna (MIT, 1999) pp. 238-248 attributing 
Wagner’s view to a combination of the essentially optical aesthetics of Adolf Hildebrand and the 
broader ideas of August Schmarsow which involved the whole body.
† Examples would be the Metzleinsthalerhof and especially the Reumannhof with its grand central 
tract, overly tall for an apartment building before elevators were built in, as seen from the open 
space of the Haydnpark across the Gürtel. Franz Kaym was likely referring to the Reumannhof when 
he wrote later that the city was interested in elections rather than the Stadtbild when it built build-
ings up to 8 stories (7 Stockwerke) high without elevators. Testimonial to Rudolf Perco, p. 19.
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entire streets to create glacis-like fi elds of fi re along their length within 
easy range of rifl es and machineguns. Extensive use of reinforced concrete 
that made cantilevers possible, solid brick walls (Massivmauerwerk) rath-
er than hollow tile, concrete-encased entries to stairwells, basement win-
dows covering entrances to courtyards, and windows that enfi laded other 
building fronts can be found everywhere.* Stairwells opened onto interior 
courtyards rather than the street as before which meant that access to up-
per fl oors was possible only from inside the courtyard. 
As a consequence, an ever-changing and moving approach to many Ge-
meindebauten generates a different “feel” about them, one unique to Vi-
enna and unsettling to a point where it should be included as part of a 
general typology relative to the Stadtbild as a whole. Opponents and com-
mentators were not paranoid in imagining weapons being fi red from many 
apertures in the blocks, eventually regarding them as a kind of urban 
Maginot Line more important to assault and retake than even the munic-
ipal electricity and gas works occupied by the rebels at the start of the 
civil war. The outward “power” suggested by the architecture seduced the 
workers into thinking that the projects could withstand attacks by oppos-
ing armed forces, the Karl-Marx-Hof being just one of a type that started 
with the Fuchsenfeldhof, the Hanuschhof and the Lassallehof. 
Many other buildings were part of the picture, not just large ones with 
hundreds of apartments but smaller ones as well. In this article I will point 
out the characteristics of three smaller buildings with around 50 apart-
ments each easily overlooked because of their size but located in areas of 
strategic interest for the overall pattern of socialist control. The sites are 
signifi cant without stretching the imagination, but the unusual forms and 
military features of the three appear unnecessary in the Stadtbild due to 
their small size unless political intentions were at work.† Regarding other 
buildings, work has been started to point out in detail how the observa-
tions of Josef Schneider can be corroborated to relieve him of the charge 
that his work was merely political rhetoric.‡ The problem of saying these 
characteristics were intentional appears immediately when intent cannot 
* A notable example is the Matteottihof at the Margareten Spitz, set back from the Gürtel and bridg-
ing Fendigasse. Set back from the Reumannhof, the Herweghof, the Metzleinstalerhof and the Julius 
Ofner-Hof, it represents defense in depth in a modern reversal of the bastion concept. See photo 
in Blau, p. 263. She notes that Fendigasse was an important gateway to the Margareten district 
inside the Gürtel. (261-262) Except for the Julius-Ofner-Hof the architects were the trusted fi rms of 
Hubert Gessner and Schmid and Aichinger. The Matteottihof was chosen as the site for a massive 
socialist youth rally on August 30, 1932. Cf. article and pictures in Arbeiter-Zeitung, Aug.30, 1932 
p. 6.
† To be sure, the importance of the locations could be considered accidental as Peball might argue.
‡ The Hautmann brothers discuss as well a tract by the anonymous “Sozius” making the same 
general charges. Over the years this author has visited and photographed from different angles 
almost all of the 377 buildings and settlements listed in Engelbert Mang”s catalogue. Unusual angles 
not seen in the photographs contained in the work of the Hautmann brothers and others provide a 
sense of what Otto Wagner meant by the kinesthetic quality of a building, in this case to emphasize 
the military potential.
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be traced in documentary form. On one level, as Otto Wagner observed, 
all the effects of a building cannot be foreseen by the architect; indeed the 
architect can himself discover like a classical composer effects in his build-
ing that he did not know were there. In addition, there is no problem with 
granting that within the guidelines set by the City Building Offi ce, there 
was enough leeway for effects to multiply relative to the site and the ar-
chitect’s imagination whether or not he intended them as useful defensive 
features.* Indeed, private architects presented many diffi culties to the 
Stadtbauamt, evidently taking enough liberties that Josef Bittner of MA 24, 
who had the fi nal say in approving plans submitted by MA 22, at one point 
was commended for his resolve to control and restrain the unruly bunch.† 
On the other hand the inclusion of militarily useful features could easily 
have been encouraged or even demanded implicitly based on the way con-
tracts were distributed. If an architect conformed to a model he would be 
well-regarded and a candidate for another contract.
Awarding Contracts
More than 180 architects were included in the program, which from the 
outset shows remarkable inclusiveness across different ideological lines, 
but there were large projects and small ones. The politics of the housing 
program involves the uncomfortable question of distributing contracts for 
designing the buildings. Conformity to a certain type of design, I am argu-
ing, did not rest on published guidelines alone but on examples presented 
by architects and decision makers in the Stadtbauamt that can be regard-
ed as normative according to what might be called the politics of the next 
contract.‡ To think otherwise would be to regard the hundreds of archi-
tects in the city as equals on a level playing fi eld, which was not the case. 
To begin with, many projects were designed by architects in MA 22 itself 
and it took a headstrong individual to ignore these models. Private archi-
tects favored by the city like Hubert Gessner, Robert Oerley or the fi rm of 
Schmid and Aichinger furnished additional examples.§
An inner circle of city offi cials controlled the distribution of contracts to the 
extent that they were responsible to no one but a few socialist politicians 
above them, notably Anton Weber who insisted that decisions on sites 
and designs were always made on the basis of technical considerations 
* The process by which this happened is convincingly studied by Blau without mentioning military 
features. Regarding the architects, few were women, and Margarete Lihotzsky along with Adolf Loos 
became alienated fairly soon for reasons convincingly explored by Blau.
† BD 1574/1924
‡ An example is the Holy-Hof of Rudolf Perco done in the same style as the Bebel-Hof and the Svo-
boda-Hof of Karl Ehn treated below. Perco then got the contract for the immense complex at Fried-
rich Engels Platz.
§ On Gessner, see Blau, p. 223.
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alone without any admixture of politics.* To deviate from a certain type 
would be poorly regarded within the inner circle and could mean profes-
sional suicide. Although there is no hint of corruption, bribery or favoritism 
to be found in the documents, the process of deciding who would design 
buildings large or small was shrouded in mystery so that decisions could 
not avoid becoming personal.† Commentary on the fairness of the sys-
tem relies more on the lack of evidence to the contrary and the reputation 
of the Austrian bureaucracy for integrity than on records of procedures 
or evidence of real accountability. At one level the mystery lends itself to 
an interpretation of the process as random, impersonal and mechanical 
as though human agency was scarcely involved. Critical observations and 
refl ections at the time are minimal to the point that Grete Lihotsky, being 
squeezed out of the program for advocating settlements over apartment 
blocks, repeated an opinion that the contracts might even be passed out in 
alphabetical order.‡ This was certainly not the case, and if she intended no 
cynicism the comment was far too kind. Clearly there were no published 
procedures to ensure fairness in choosing architects. The comment has 
been used since then as an excuse to avoid hard questions or even to sug-
gest that the obscure nature of distributing contracts indicated even-hand-
edness. The offi ces of city government involved have left no minutes of 
meetings to provide insight into how decisions were made. It is easily 
forgotten, therefore, that decisions were made by persons, with the high 
likelihood that they were made according to personal preferences, pro-
fessional, well-informed and technical though they might have been, sub-
ject to pressures and personal motives. The opaque quality of the process 
ineluctably had an effect on an architect seeking a city contract. This might 
have been avoided if they had been isolated from one another, but there 
was a body of public opinion among architects in Vienna, confi rmed by 
Ursula Prokop when she says that Rudolf Perco started his estrangement 
from other architects when he submitted an idiosyncratic design for re-
* At his trial Weber defl ected responsibility for the Gemeindebauten onto the Baudirektion saying he 
inspected them occasionally but always with a Referent from the Stadtbauamt and never made any 
changes in the plans. AVA Polizeidirektion Wien, Akten Feb. 1934 Karton 1 Zl Pr. IV 2606/1934. As 
head of Verwaltungsgruppe IV, however, Weber was ultimately in charge of designs and would have 
remained so even after a proposed redistribution of responsibilities in 1927. Cf. BD 4309/1927 and 
4310/1927. VG IV included Adalbert Millik in its ranking committee who was vocal in claiming that 
the city was building military bases. Peball, 55.
† A vignette shows an incident of nepotism, it would seem, when a nephew of Theodor Körner got 
an entry level job without going through the usual hiring process. Shortly thereafter a warning was 
issued not to short circuit the hiring process. BD1847/1924
‡ The city wanted 10,000 apartments in 1925 of which 9500 were to be in blocks. BD 73/1924. Cu-
riously, Lihotsky seems to ignore possible political motives in the process. Attributing the opinion to 
other architects implies remarkable resignation on their part as well. Blau’s repetition without ques-
tion is surprising and she faults the architectural profession, which is hardly fair. Cf. Blau, 351-352. 
On one hand she grants that the politics of the program largely determined decision making but on 
the other hand she, and others, suggest that the politicians deferred to the architects on matters of 
design because they were incompetent in such matters. Another critic, Leopold Bauer, was known 
for right-wing sympathies and after 1926 got contracts only for a settlement on the edge of town 
and one block as part of a team of architects. Ursula Prokop is aware of the problem but suspends 
judgment. p.114
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building the Palace of Justice after 1927.* The results of the above can be 
deduced. With choices of architects essentially made in secret and many 
opportunities to work for the city, any combination of reluctance to alien-
ate offi cials in the Stadtbauamt and ambition to receive a contract had at 
least three effects: fi rst, there was no room for criticism among architects 
regarding the decision making process itself; second, negative comment 
about designs chosen by the Stadtbauamt had to be muted;† third, the 
unoffi cial “look” of a building could not deviate too much from the type of 
building favored by the Stadtbauamt once a contract was secured. Con-
formity therefore extended beyond offi cial guidelines to reading the minds 
of offi cials or architects favored by the city shown in models presented for 
imitation. The larger and more prominent the example the more norma-
tive it became. With high probability the anonymity of the persons making 
decisions generated fear rather than reassurance. In the broader politics 
of the decade this can be interpreted as part of revolutionary times when 
the program was an integral part of Social Democratic partisan politics 
using the integrity of Austrian offi cialdom as a screen to hide favoritism 
and erect the kind of building called for in dangerous times. The author is 
aware that this is a serious allegation that relies on the logic of the situa-
tion rather than documentary evidence. But other commentary is specu-
lative as well. The thinking behind it is unwelcome to architectural histori-
ans who have dominated the fi eld until now and tend to view the program 
through rose-colored glasses, but it should be proposed in line with rea-
sons and the examples that follow. The Karl-Marx-Hof then becomes only 
one of many examples.
Lassallestrasse
The housing program of Vienna was bureaucratic in the extreme. Guide-
lines for the size of apartments, windows, water, gas, toilets, and the like 
were carefully set, and subsequent control by representatives of the Hous-
ing Authority led to complaints about over-regulation and social experi-
mentation. The largest number of apartments were between 38 and 48m², 
that is between 409 and 516 square feet, sizes chosen early in 1924 and 
kept late into the program.‡ The outward confi guration of the blocks was 
another matter since there seemed to be no prescription or guidelines 
about their place in the cityscape as a whole. A type could become ac-
cepted to the point of becoming normative apart from written guidelines 
as was shown in a rare competition run by the Stadtbauamt during the 
summer of 1923 for a block named the Lassallehof. At the time the result 
* Prokop, p. 229, “…ist auch ein Symbol sieiner beginnnenden Eigenbrötelei, die ihn allmählich in 
eine Isolierung führt.”
† A comment by Heinrich Schmid in 1928 that “criticism is progress” becomes hypocritical because 
his fi rm had been favored by the city from the early days of the Republic. Cf. Blau, 350.
‡ BD 380/1924. Letter dated February 1, 1924. The choice between a larger number of apartments 
or larger individual apartments came down on the side of larger numbers. Helmut Weihsmann cov-
ers this well. pp. 41-54.
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passed as a fair outcome, and there seem to have been no objections, but 
at second glance today the process generates questions. Architects were 
invited to compete for a large building of 294 apartments along Lassall-
estrasse near the right bank of the Danube on the approach to the Reichs 
Bridge. Ninety-one architects submitted designs to a jury of eight, three 
members of the Stadtbauamt and fi ve private architects. Two of the pri-
vate architects on the jury, Robert Oerley and Franz Kaym, were close to 
the Stadtbauamt in their thinking. Oerley had already done the Hanus-
chhof in 1922 of a size equal to the Lassallehof and would collaborate with 
Karl Krist of the Stadtbauamt on a massive complex of 1084 apartments 
in 1927 eventually named after George Washington. Franz Kaym had writ-
ten earlier in favor of settlements but was wasting no time in adjusting to 
the new emphasis on blocks. Along with his partner Alfons Hetmanek he 
soon designed several large projects.* It is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the jury was stacked in favor of offi cial opinion. To compound a charge 
of cronyism, the winner of the competition was Karl Krist, a city architect 
employed in MA 22, while second place went to a team of relative un-
knowns assembled by Hubert Gessner, an architect known as a favorite of 
the Stadtbauamt. The assignment did not go to Krist and the Stadtbauamt 
in the end, but to Gessner.† There is no documentary evidence that there 
were any cynical complaints about the fairness of the process with the 
Stadtbauamt in effect winning its own competition, or the contract going 
to Gessner, but the 88 losers could hardly mistake the message. As the 
city was announcing a goal of building 25,000 apartments in the next fi ve 
years and distributing contracts liberally, an architect who got a contract 
and designed a building the way the Stadtbauamt wanted it stood a good 
chance of getting another assignment. A complaint or a major deviation 
from the example set by the Lassallehof at the start of the program would 
result in a contract for a small building to fi ll a vacant lot between existing 
buildings or jeopardize further work entirely. Later competitions were limit-
ed such that they scarcely deserved the name. 
The resulting design contained a tower projecting onto the sidewalk past 
the building line as well as balconies and setbacks that appear regularly in 
subsequent designs and can be considered militarily useful features of the 
Gemeinde Wien type. The dominant feature of this location in the Stadtbild 
is its relation to the Reichs Bridge. (Figure 2) 
* They designed the second part of the Weissenböckstrasse settlement to be treated later in this 
article.
† Blau Ch. 8 p. 471, Footnote 78 on relations between Gessner and the city. On announcing the 
competition cf. BD [ohne Zahl] 1924 after BD 146/1924 located in Karton BD A1-35. Blau goes 
so far as to suggest that the jury itself was assembled by Gessner rather than the Stadtbauamt 
without further comment on the fairness of the competition. The semblance of a team effort with 
younger architects apparently was dropped for the neighboring Heizmannhof which Gessner de-
signed the following year.
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The contrast with nearby buildings relative to the building lines is unmis-
takable, demonstrating that the city was willing to grant itself extensive 
variances for future Gemeindebauten. By the same token a sense that the 
features could be used for military purposes in an emergency might easily 
occur to someone with political/military responsibilities; the observations 
can be considered part of a kinesthetic interpretation of the building. The 
Lassallehof “covers” the Reichs Bridge in a military sense. It was joined 
Figure 2. Lassallehof, and the 
same from a distance looking to-
ward the Reichs Bridge. The small 
ventilation windows in toilet cubi-
cles are not evident in the design 
as yet. The Schüttau-Hof arose on 
the far side of the Danube in 1924 
followed by the massive Goethe-
Hof with 727 apartments close to 
the Reichs Bridge in 1928.  
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the next year by the Heizmannhof across Lassallestrasse, also designed 
by Gessner—this time alone--to dominate the approach to one side of the 
Danube.  The features found in the Lassallehof would be seen in several 
examples built in the following three years. The building in itself, therefore, 
with the liberties the city allowed itself in suspending the building lines to 
have the tower protrude onto the sidewalk as well as its place within the 
Stadtbild at the Reichs Bridge, supports a contention that it contained po-
litical warnings both to architects wishing to win contracts and to military 
observers aware of the history of military bases within the city. These con-
tentions have no documentary proof as yet but are in no way irresponsible. 
The building(s) are there and look threatening, while the way the contract 
was allocated as well as the timing at the start of the largest portion of the 
program support suspicions of favoritism and setting norms for future sub-
missions by private architects. 
Military Presence in Vienna
An analogy with earlier examples of military installations in Vienna is in 
order here. There were several precedents for placing bases in residential 
areas of the city. The Imperial government built three of special interest 
in the aftermath of the revolution in 1848 to intimidate the populace and 
function as defensible fortresses in the event of another uprising. Two of 
them were placed along the Danube Canal on either side of the inner city, 
the Rossauer Kaserne and the Franz-Josef-Kaserne. Designed in the hey-
day of Romanticism, the red-brick Rossauer Kaserne with its crenelated 
castle architecture contained military features restricted mostly to forti-
fi ed entries, towers and a few setbacks that could enfi lade the walls in the 
event of an attack. The results look today more like a Disneyland castle 
than an urban garrison meant to deter revolutionaries. The Franz-Joseph-
Kaserne on the other side of the inner city along the Danube Canal in the 
area of the present Urania was a barracks that had few fortress-like char-
acteristics. It became superfl uous within a few decades under changed 
political conditions and was torn down to extend the Ring to the Danube 
Canal. Without much stretch of the imagination the Lassallehof at the 
Reichs Bridge can be considered analogous to the Franz-Joseph-Kaserne 
while the huge housing complex on Friedrich-Engels-Platz at the Florids-
dorf Bridge occupies a location not unlike the Rossauer Kaserne with sim-
ilarly monumental features. Other Kasernen built before World War I like 
the Wilhelms- and Albrechts- Kasernen in the Second District near the 
main course of the Danube and the base in Breitensee on the western 
edge of the city near two reservoirs had outward appearances that blend-
ed into their neighborhoods more like Biedermaier apartment buildings 
than fortresses. The Arsenal was a special case, much larger than any of 
the others and overtly defensible but of less interest in this discussion. 
In addition, military needs had changed by World War I after the threat 
of urban revolution disappeared so that the government relocated sev-
eral bases to the edge of town and sold the land to the city, notably the 
Krimsky Kaserne in the Third District, but all the same ten active bases 
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still remained after World War I with skeleton garrisons. Actually more 
important than the Army bases at the time were the headquarters of the 
Federal Police in the Third District known as the Marokkaner Kaserne. The 
installation and its garrison grew signifi cantly after 1927 along with police 
stations throughout the city while the army itself remained small under the 
Treaty of St. Germain. 
Parity among Armed Groups 
The Austrian Army was reduced to 30,000 under the Treaty of St. Ger-
main, a number probably inadequate to maintain order within the country 
in case of a revolution even if kept up to full strength, but according to 
Kurt Peball in 1934 the number was closer to 25,000.11 It was equipped 
mostly with small arms that included light and some heavy machineguns 
together with two sizes of relatively small fi eld artillery and some mortars. 
Peball puts the number of troops engaged in Vienna in 1934 at around 
4250 with 16 artillery pieces and 15 mortars, a number that seems re-
markably low for maintaining security in a large metropolis threatened 
once again by an uprising not unlike that of 1848.*
The socialist paramilitary group, the Republikanischer Schutzbund had 
grown slowly from 1924 when Theodor Körner was identifi ed as a like-
ly person to lead what was essentially a protective association. His main 
competition was Julius Deutsch who was more a politician than a soldier. 
Mostly unarmed Schutzbund members cared for the wounded and evacu-
ated them during the riots of 1927, but the humanitarian activities during 
the crisis betrayed a lack of focus for a paramilitary organization. There-
after the party began to reorganize it along military lines and began to 
distribute weapons clandestinely among the Gemeindebauten, entrusting 
them to local members of the Schutzbund. By 1932 these Vertrauensmän-
ner could call on large numbers of men from among the mostly socialist 
residents of the projects, but lack of training hampered their ability to 
handle weapons or maneuver in groups. Efforts to remedy the situation 
were made in public view in1932 when the Schutzbund conducted large 
scale war games in Purkersdorf just west of Vienna. The Arbeiter-Zeitung 
reported that a total of 10,000 men divided into two armies “fought” each 
other in the woods south of the Vienna River Valley while another 3000 
men were present as observers.† Peball puts the number of Schutzbündler 
in Vienna at around 17,550 in 1934.‡
* Peball, 47-49. Peball was given access to a few documents not available to this researcher. Cf. 
Anhang IV.
† As with all such estimates they might be exaggerated. For details see Arbeiter-Zeitung, June 27, 
1932 p. 1. (Figure 1)
‡ p. 42. State Secretary Emil Fey concurred in the cabinet meeting of October 18, 1933 with Doll-
fuss presiding (AVA Ministerratsprotokoll Nr. 830) putting the number at 18,00 0 effectives among 
30,000 members of the Schutzbund.
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Meanwhile, the right wing Heimwehr held exercises elsewhere in Austria. 
It conducted an exercise in Innsbruck in June, 1932, openly carrying ri-
fl es with machineguns mounted on motorcycles and carried by animals.12 
Peball does not venture a guess on their numbers although each District 
in Vienna claimed a “company.”* The Army and Federal Police conducted 
their own training. Though the Federal Police were prepared to work close-
ly with the Army in 1934 the two could not be considered integrated into 
a single unit. None of these groups except the Army had weapons heavier 
than machineguns. The Nazis with their Austrian Legion were not strong 
enough at the time to complicate the picture signifi cantly while a rural 
gendarmerie stayed out of Viennese politics for the most part. Some in 
the Social Democratic camp hoped for defections from the Executive, as 
the government forces were called, in the event of a civil war, recalling the 
spirit of the left wing Soldiers Councils of 1918, but by 1934 the likelihood 
was remote given the elite nature of the Executive and the political polar-
ization. Plans to capture the army installations within the city were sketchy 
in the famous Eifl er Plan for Schutzbund operations, perhaps due to the 
small garrisons; surprisingly the bases seemed so unimportant that they 
hardly drew mention in the plan as though capturing them was a foregone 
conclusion. At any rate the Schutzbund appeared not at all intimidated by 
them.† 
Complicating the situation in Vienna were thousands of weapons kept from 
the Allies by common consent after World War I. They were stored since 
1922 by an agreement among the parties in the Arsenal, a vast complex 
of fortifi ed buildings in the XI. District where arms had been manufactured 
and stored after 1848. The Arsenal was more formidable than either the 
Rossauer or the Franz-Josef Kasernen, though scarcely as dominating as 
the fortress built on the heights above Budapest at the same time for the 
same reasons. It was under the control of the Social Democrats in the im-
mediate aftermath of WWI rather than the Army in a compromise agree-
able to all parties at the mercy of the vindictive Allies and newly formed 
countries surrounding Austria, but the presence of so many weapons in the 
city under socialist control inevitably drew attention when political tensions 
increased. On February 3, 1927, fi ve months before the riots of July fol-
lowing the Schattendorf acquittals, the government conducted a raid and 
confi scated 665 machineguns along with 21,465 rifl es. The storm of crit-
icism that followed died down quickly in a curious way, possibly because 
the number of weapons hidden there might have been as high as 600,000, 
* Peball, 46. See Otto Naderer on the strengths and weaknesses of the Schutzbund without much 
comparison with the numbers and strength of the Army, Federal Police, Heimwehr or Nazi forma-
tions. Otto Naderer, Der Bewaffnete Aufstand: der Republikanische Schutzbund der Österreichischen 
Sozialdemokratie und die Militärische Vorbereitung auf den Bürgerkrieg 1923-1934. Found online at 
Österreichs Bundesheer.
† Peball, 47-49. The Eifl er Plan lists the ten with an amateurish directive that at the start of hostil-
ities they should be stormed or cut off. He adds neighborhood police stations almost as an after-
thought. Quoted in Duczynska, 356.
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according to Otto Naderer.* Still, without a threat to oppose force with 
force there was nothing to stop the federal government from gradually dis-
arming the socialists. The trend became clear during the summer of 1927 
when the riots caught the city government unprepared. The Schutzbund 
proved incapable of putting itself between the demonstrators and the po-
lice armed with rifl es and drawn up in military formation. The city hastily 
formed a Gemeindewache or City Watch meant as an auxiliary force in the 
absence of its own police force but it never amounted to much as the City 
Council argued about what to do with yet another executive force.
The foregoing has been covered more extensively by others, but for our 
purposes the effects can be described roughly as parity among armed 
groups in the city: the federal government had better organization and 
training, adequate though not overwhelming infantry weapons, and a few 
pieces of fi eld artillery while the socialists had considerably larger numbers 
of men armed with rifl es, machine guns and adequate ammunition.† Good 
relations between the Social Democrats and the Czechs together with rail 
communications controlled by sympathetic railway unions provided hope 
for additional arms and ammunition. The Gemeindebauten entered the pic-
ture as military bases with men and weapons distributed after the raid on 
the Arsenal and the disturbances of 1927. One conclusion is that neither 
side felt itself at a particular disadvantage should the unsettled political sit-
uation lead to civil war. The outcome of a confl ict was not a foregone con-
clusion. Riots between socialists and the emergent Nazis led to a ban on 
public demonstrations portending further complications, but events con-
fi rmed the radical and violent direction of politics in the city even without 
much involvement by Hitler for the time being.‡
Two Small Examples of Political/Military Interest
Two buildings separated by the entire city are of interest here to point out 
a range of partisan politics and possible military intent connected with the 
housing program. One is a small block of 22 apartments, later called the 
Josef Rautmann Hof, strategically placed at the Hadersdorf-Weidlingau 
Spitz in the XIV. District, an unusually constricted location where a ma-
jor highway, the Hadersdorf-Weidlingau Hauptstrasse crosses the Vienna 
River at the edge of the city to enter Lower Austria and proceed westward 
through the Vienna Woods along the valley of the Vienna River. The West-
bahn railroad uses the same narrow corridor so that the highway, railroad 
and river fi nd themselves crowded together at the western boundary of the 
* Otto Naderer, op. cit.
† A short essay comparing the Schutzbund and the Heimwehr that emphasizes the fl uctuations 
and internal divisions of both groups as the decade progressed can be found in Barry McLoughlin, 
“Heimwehr and Schutzbund” in Kampf um die Stadt: Exhibition catalogue of Wien Museum, Hg. v. 
Wolfgang Kos pp. 46-54.
‡ Though the Federal Police were prepared to work closely with the Army in 1934 the forces of the 
Executive should not be considered a monolith.
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city. The strategic importance of the bridge over the Vienna River is obvi-
ous. The building is a long distance from others in the program and provid-
ed the socialists with an outpost at the edge of town for use as needed.
At the far side of town in the XXI. District lies a remote and incongruous 
block of 51 apartments located among truck gardens at Josef Baumann 
Gasse 65-67. Also close to the border with Lower Austria which wraps 
around the city, it was built in 1929 at the doorstep of a cooperative settle-
ment sponsored by the city early in the program at a time when the bour-
geois attitudes of private homeowners were not as yet clear. The modest 
apartment block has few military features, but the project with its reliable 
socialist residents was clearly a political counterweight to its bourgeois 
neighbors. Interest in the project among city offi cials was suffi cient to buy 
the land at about three times the price of undeveloped land elsewhere 
which required the approval of Anton Weber.* The architect was Karl Krist 
of the Stadtbauamt who had designed the original settlement and had won 
the competition for the Lassallehof. The political nature of the project is 
unmistakable given the year it was erected and the number of inhabitants, 
which was about equal to the number in the settlement. 
Three Examples of Military Architecture
The three examples I have chosen are relatively small buildings. One in 
the XIX. District of Döbling separated from the Karl-Marx-Hof by a street 
and a green space now used largely for parking. Another is in the II. Dis-
trict of Leopoldstadt, across from the freight terminals of the Northwest 
Railway and near a street node known as Am Tabor. The third, in the XI. 
District of Simmering, lies along Simmeringer Hauptstrasse, an arterial 
leading out of town beyond the Arsenal toward the airport relatively far 
removed from the center of town. They are chosen for their distinctive 
features relative to the Stadtbild to show that militarily useful features can 
be found in smaller blocks easily ignored in the attention paid to the Karl-
Marx-Hof. (Figure 3)
The Svoboda-Hof
During World War I, the federal railway planned to build a union station 
for all three northern railways on the Hagenwiese under the escarpment of 
Hohe Warte, but the changed circumstances after 1918 led it to give the 
land to the city. The railroad was known as a socialist stronghold so the 
transition went smoothly, unlike negotiations over the land around the
* BD 626/1929. The document contradicts Weber’s claim on Dec. 19, 1927 that sites were chosen 
on technical grounds alone. Peball, 55. Prices varied widely with the average for undeveloped land 
around S5/m2 and the lowest being S 1.21/m2 for land from the bankrupt Bodenkredit Anstalt in 
1930 (with a claim that some of it was really worth only 30 Groschen per m2). BD 3320/30. The 
city even compensated Aegidius Loidolt, the owner, for the spinach crop he had planted. The plan 
was disingenuous in being billed an expansion of the settlement when the city intended to build an 
apartment block.
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Stadtlau railroad bridge with more complicated ownership.* The property 
was long and narrow, extending westward from Krailplatz nearly to 
Gunoldstrasse, an important thoroughfare that approached the area from 
under three railroad bridges immediately to the south before it curved to 
* The Army controlled the land in 1917 and referred the request to the Finance Ministry which had 
not relinquished the land by 1924. Cf. BD 1942/1924 in Baudirektion Wien notes of Michael Zeps.
Figure 3. Interesting examples of other relatively small buildings similar to the three 
that follow can be found elsewhere. For example, a companion to the Hanuschhof at 
Schlachthausgasse 2-6 in the III. District directly faces the Stadium Bridge over the 
Danube Canal. This block of 134 apartments from 1926 by Josef and Arthur Berger and 
Martin Ziegler has fortress-like features. The location was the end point of the inner 
defensive ring laid down in the Eifl er Plan of 1934 where the defensive line following 
the outline of the Gürtel met the Danube Canal. Cf. Aktionsplan für Wien in Duczynska, 
351.
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the left and climbed the heights of Döbling.* An existing building blocked 
immediate access to Gunoldstrasse where it emerged from the third un-
derpass, and weak laws on eminent domain prevented the city from ac-
quiring it. Heiligenstädterstrasse was a major east-west highway at the 
base of the heights that bordered the Hagenwiese to the north. With the 
exception of the Svoboda-Hof this land became the site of the Karl-Marx-
Hof, a single building one kilometer in length bounded on the south by the 
railroad embankment of the Franz Josef Bahn. Boschstrasse now separates 
the building and the embankment.
The entire parcel was included in projections when the city announced the 
program to build 25,000 apartments beginning in 1924.† The site plan, 
or Lageplan, called for several buildings stretched out along Heiligenstäd-
terstrasse separated from each other by short streets rather than a single 
building or the two that eventually appeared. The westernmost building 
projected in the site plan was separated from Gunoldstrasse by the exist-
ing building and a street 20 meters wide. (Figure 4) If realized, the re-
sult would have been a building scarcely visible from Gunoldstrasse as it 
passed under the three sets of railroad tracks. 
The plan outlined in 1924 was to develop the site with 6 buildings starting 
in 1925, but for reasons not clear from the documents the proposal was 
suspended and the matter reopened for suggestions. 
A prominent architect, Clemens Holzmeister, proposed a series of low row 
houses, but the suggestion was rejected by the Stadtbauamt which chose 
a design that became two projects, the Svoboda-Hof of 1926-27 and the 
Karl-Marx-Hof of 1927-1930.‡ If the Karl-Marx-Hof had approached the 
existing building on Gunoldstrasse but not abutted it, with a street 20 me-
ters wide between them, an approach from the south along Gunoldstrasse 
would have been concealed from view. In military terms, the Karl-Marx-Hof 
could have been outfl anked easily following Gunoldstrasse under the three 
railroad bridges protected by the embankments. Instead, the Stadtbauamt 
decided that the westernmost portion of the property would become a sep-
arate building of 62 apartments, but would abut the existing building di-
rectly without any street between them thereby moving it 20 meters closer 
to Gunoldstrasse where the street emerged from under the bridges 
* Doderer’s alter ego Geyrenhoff remembers twenty years later a premonition of the battle that 
would take place below him as he stood on the escarpment in 1926. P. 1054.
† BD 1930-1924
‡ The Svobodahof was begun Oct. 18, 1926 and taken over by the city Oct. 21, 1927. The Karl-
Marx-Hof was begun July 2, 1927, a second part on Sept 16, 1927 and taken over in several stages 
between Nov. 26, 1928 and Sept. 1, 1930. Schlöss Catalogue, Nachlass Heinrich Schlöss. For Holz-




and turned to the left. What became the Svoboda-Hof thus occupied the 
site from Boschstrasse to Heiligenstädterstrasse. The area was treated 
separately from the other lots in the original Lageplan and remained so 
when the other fi ve were unifi ed to become the Karl-Marx-Hof. The archi-
tect assigned to both buildings, small and large, was Karl Ehn of MA 22, a 
student of Otto Wagner, so both were designed by the Stadtbauamt itself 
rather than given to private architects, and the plans were drawn up by 
Figure 4. General Lageplan of the Hagenwiese and detail of the western part that became 
the Svoboda-Hof. Original plan for what became the Svoboda-Hof. The land and building 
along Gunoldstrasse itself remained in private hands.
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Ehn in quick succession if not at the same time.* The outward appearanc-
es share much in common.
The following analysis uses as its rationale the observation that buildings 
can be regarded kinesthetically from different distances and angles of 
approach as well as from one vantage point in contributing to the Stadt-
* Ehn remained in the Stadtbauamt during the authoritarian regime and applied to join the Nazi 
Party in 1938. Evidently he was not accepted because he could claim after the war that he was 
never a member. He remained a city employee during the war, however, writing later that it was the 
period of his greatest humiliation when his duties were reduced to those of a functionary. Cf. Ques-
tionnaire signed on Oct. 8, 1938 where he wrote “angemeldet” in response to the question whether 
he was a member of the NSDAP, and letters of January 1, 1949 and February 12, 1949, found in 
Biographische Sammlung of the Stadt u. Landesarchiv. His Familienasyl, designed in 1938, is inter-
esting for its reprise of the small toilet ventilation windows found in many earlier Gemeindebauten.
Figure 5. Svoboda-Hof, is the buff-colored building to the right, from afar along Gunoldstrasse 
and from close in (below).
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bild of the district and the city as a whole. The Svoboda-Hof is relatively 
unobtrusive, tucked against the railroad embankment in the shadow of 
the Karl-Marx-Hof and is not especially impressive as a monument. On the 
other hand, the result of Ehn’s effort is a building that faces the length of 
Gunoldstrasse to the south in such a way that no one can approach under 
the three railroad bridges without being seen. (Figure 5) 
An attacker cannot use the bridges or railroad embankment as conceal-
ment as one might if a street separated the two buildings. The usual set 
of small toilet windows punctuate the façade in the design. Up close, a 
stairwell, not encased in masonry, extends beyond the Baulinien onto the 
sidewalk. Masonry balconies project out and extend around the building 
with views in various directions including part of Boschstrasse between the 
Karl-Marx-Hof and the railroad. Geistingergasse, a short street connecting 
Boschstrasse to Heiligenstädterstrasse runs the length of the Svoboda-Hof 
on the side facing the Karl-Marx-Hof. The building occupies the entire 
space between the two streets. (Figures 6 and 7) 
Because the Karl-Marx-Hof is set back somewhat along Heiligenstädter-
strasse the Svoboda-Hof enfi lades the length of the Karl-Marx-Hof with 
some of its balconies and small windows. In addition, the façade of the 
Svoboda-Hof along Heiligenstädterstrasse is a short distance from the 
important intersection of Gunoldstrasse and Heiligenstädterstrasse. The 
overall result, in military terms, is that the Svoboda-Hof occupies a posi-
tion protecting the narrow end of the Karl-Marx-Hof on three sides to pre
Figure 6.
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vent its fl ank from being turned by units approaching from either direction 
along Gunoldstrasse or, in a worst-case scenario, from Geistingergasse. 
The side along Geistingergasse that enfi lades the side of the Karl-Marx-Hof 
facing Heiligenstädterstrasse provides protection in the event of a frontal 
assault on the larger structure from that direction, that is from the slopes 
of the Hohe Warte 
above it. The result 
can be described as a 
kind of demilune in 
the classical style of 
Vauban, detached 
from the main body 
of the Karl-Marx-Hof 
to add strength to the 
whole. Is this prepos-
terous? In response, 
one can simply point 
to the building, the 
Objekt, and say it is 
there, occupying a 
place in the Stadtbild, 
located and designed 
together with the 
Karl-Marx-Hof by the 
city and the same 
architect during revo-
lutionary rather than 
peaceful times in 
keeping with a tradi-
tion of military archi-
tecture in Vienna and 
recent experience 
with the strength of 
the defensive in World 
War I. When the city 
chose to design the 
Karl-Marx-Hof as a 
fortress-like building 
over less overtly 
threatening alterna-
tives like that of Holz-
meister it could hard-
ly have done better 
than design the Svo-
boda-Hof as it did to 
protect the fl ank of 
the Karl-Marx-Hof in Figure 7. Svoboda-Hof from different distances along Heiligenstädterstrasse. 
Karl-Marx-Hof is to the left.
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the event of a confl ict. 
Marinelligasse 1/Taborstrasse
The second relatively small building of interest here was built in the II. 
District along Taborstrasse, a major arterial in front of the Northwest 
Freight Terminal, on a corner facing Am Tabor, an important intersection, 
and running along Marinelligasse toward the embankment of the Northern 
Railway (Nordbahn). It was designed by Leopold Schulz, a Jewish private 
architect in the heavily Jewish Leopoldstadt but by no means the only 
Jewish architect who worked for the city.* The building was relatively small 
at 52 apartments, approved in May, 1926 and fi nished in May, 1927. Curi-
ously, Schulz got only one other contract, in the following year for a build-
ing of about the same size.† The land was bought for an undisclosed price 
from two owners who kept an adjacent building on Taborstrasse.‡ The 
Railroad owned the neighboring building on Marinelligasse so the Stadt-
bauamt anticipated no objection to the design arising from that quarter 
although one window of the older building facing the new project would 
open only on a light shaft.§
A more important exception to the guidelines involved a projection—Ri-
salit in German--beyond the building lines along Taborstrasse to allow a 
row of balconies with doors and masonry balustrades that provided a view 
down the length of Taborstrasse. The variance, which added 3 meters to 
the façade facing Am Tabor and 1.25 meters to the side of the building 
along Taborstrasse, attracted attention and concern from the Baupolizei or 
Building Police of MA 37. The Gemeinderat had approved building on the 
site on May, 7, 1926, but in an unusual directive dated July 24, 1926 the 
Baupolizei wrote that several other departments should be notifi ed includ-
ing MA 23b, MA 36, MA 17 and MA 47. Furthermore the Baupolizei insisted 
that before building started written (emphasis theirs) permission was to be 
sought, suggesting that problems with the variance might arise and that 
the Baupolizei had something of a veto right in the matter.¶ As usual no 
reasons are given for the changes to the building lines although one plau-
sible reason might have been that it added 10% to the space of a relative-
ly small building. On the other hand the courtyard could have been small-
er. There is no evidence otherwise to indicate pressing needs relative to 
the site that might have led the Stadtbauamt or Leopold Schulz to submit 
the unusual design. The number of apartments in buildings was fl exible in 
* Schulz died in Mauthausen a few weeks before the Allies liberated the camp.
† Brßlgasse 45-47 in the XVI District.
‡ They are identifi ed as Margaret Zechl and siblings Dietrich and Marie Streicher.
§ Information taken from fi le on Marinelligasse 1 in fi les of MA 37, Baupolizei.
¶ Data taken from Baupolizei (MA 37) on Marinelligasse 1. “Vor Beginn des Baues ist um die Auss-
teckung der Baulinie und des Niveaus schriftlich anzusuchen.” Underlined in the original.
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general and there was no obvious reason to increase the number on this 
particular lot. Six other projects in the II. District had fewer apartments 
with one containing only eight. An unusual result recorded for no other 
buildings in the entire program was the cost overruns encountered by the 
time the building was fi nished in 1927. The Magistrats-Direktion request-
ed an accounting in July, but the Stadtbauamt put off the matter until the 
higher offi ce added “urgency” to its request in October, 1927.* MA 22 was 
especially interested in this design and evidently embarrassed by the add-
ed expense. 
Marinelligasse 1 was one of twenty-one projects built in the II. District and 
the fi rst to be built in the district after the Lassalle-Hof and Heizmann-Hof 
discussed earlier.† It was relatively isolated from the others with the near-
est being a large project of 217 apartments at Obere Augartenstrasse 
12-14 begun in 1931. A set of buildings near the Danube along Engerth-
strasse and Wehlistrasse were far from Am Tabor and the Nordwestbahn-
hof. This left Marinelligasse 1 as the only project of any importance in the 
central part of the district. Its relative isolation makes it more important as 
an expression of socialist architectural intent. It stands out, facing Am 
Tabor and the adjoining streets as an admonition in the Stadtbild that city 
* BD 2290/1927. Letter of October 27, 1927.
† Eight of them fi lled gaps between existing buildings. Cf. Die Gemeindebauten des Roten Wiens, 
261-271.
Figure 8. Marinelligasse 1, from Am Tabor.
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authorities intended something different for the new epoch of building in 
Vienna. The location is strategic, lying at one corner of a built-up equilater-
al triangle formed by Taborstrasse, Marinelligasse and Nordbahnstrasse at 
the foot of the raised embankment of the Nordbahn. The freight terminal 
of the Nordwestbahn, really more a collection of loading docks since the 
railway lacked passenger service, lies across Taborstrasse. The more im-
portant street of the two at the site was undoubtedly Taborstrasse with its 
streetcar line, capacity 
for vehicles and traffi c 
node at Am Tabor. The 
extra 1.25 meters that 
projected onto the 
sidewalk along Tabor-
strasse gave an unim-
peded view down the 
street all the way to 
Nordbahn-strasse 
beneath the embank-
ment, a distance of 
300 to 400 meters. 
This meant that any 
approach to Am Tabor 
from the Nordbahn 
embankment along 
Taborstrasse was 
easily within the range 
of rifl es or machine-
guns stationed on the 
balconies of Marinelli-
gasse 1. The blunt 
façade facing Am 
Tabor a short distance 
away covers that 
intersection with four 
sets of balconies, two 
facing Taborstrasse 
and two facing Mari-
nelligasse, along with 
the windows of the 
building. Basement 
windows that appear 
to be more than air 
shafts could also be 
used for defensive 
purposes. The side 
Figure 9. Marinelligasse 1 from along Taborstrasse
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along Marinelligasse is less striking but has balconies covering the length 
of the street toward Nordbahnstrasse made possible by the 6 meter exten-
sion beyond the building line facing Am Tabor. (Figures 8-10) 
The kinesthetic response to approaching the building from all three direc-
tions, from Am Tabor, along the length of Taborstrasse from the Nordbahn, 
and along Marinelligasse and even from underneath the balconies them-
selves, is disturbing if one considers the possibility that armed fi ghters 
might be occupying the building. It is unlike any others in the neighbor-
hood, projecting itself in three directions at once with metaphorical “asser-
tiveness.”
Military interpretations of Marinelligasse 1 or of the Svoboda-Hof as po-
tential threats to the surrounding area were left to the imagination of the 
viewer. It was one of many such metaphors of power and control that 
marked the type of the Gemeindebau in Vienna between the wars which 
call for inclusion in the interpretation of the program, both of individu-
al buildings and the cityscape as a whole. When Josef Bittner announced 
a new building epoch he was fully conscious of the impact each housing 
project would make on the Stadtbild, an image for all to see and interpret 
according to the impression it made on them. The impression was provoc-
Figure 10. Marinelligasse 1 from Marinelligasse. Cf. pictures in fi le 2010-11-16.
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ative and aggressive from the start, growing stronger in the years 1925-
1928 for individual buildings culminating in the Karl-Marx-Hof and for the 
program as a whole in Friedrich-Engels-Platz even after the more overtly 
military features had been downplayed starting in 1928. When rifl es and 
machineguns appeared in the projects in 1934 no one was surprised, for 
machineguns appeared in the projects in 1934 no one was surprised, for 
the metaphor of domination had become the reality of defending a rebel-
lion. Engels Platz signifi ed the triumph of the program in placing 60,000 
apartments in 370 projects throughout the city; it also meant that the 
workers had the means to defend themselves against threats from the 
right should their own plans for the class struggle be frustrated. The inclu-
sion of expensive fortress-like features in smaller buildings like the Svobo-
da-Hof and Marinelligasse 1 indicates that there was intent across a wide 
spectrum of projects to impress opponents with military potential rather 
than merely to provide additional air, light or decoration for a housing pro-
gram.
Wiessenböckstrasse II.Teil
The third project of interest is a small complex of apartment buildings 
separated from each other by a mall rather than surrounding a courtyard. 
It is attached to an earlier settlement of rowhouses and gardens on Weis-
senböckstrasse in the XI. District at the junction with Simmeringer Haupt-
strasse on the way to the airport at considerable distance from the center 
of town. A large complex on the same arterial at Fickey Strasse a few 
blocks closer in on Simmeringer Hauptstrasse was not erected until 1931 
while a series of buildings at Herder Platz in the same vicinity containing 
more than 1100 apartments was started earlier but two blocks distant 
from the important Simmeringer Hauptstrasse. This last was the scene of 
considerable fi ghting in 1934, notably at the Karl-Höger-Hof. 
The settlement at Weissenböckstrasse/Simmeringer Hauptstrasse is some-
thing of an oddity. As a whole the project was one of a few settlements 
(Gemeinde Siedlungen) which were a grudging continuation of the popular 
settlement movement but owned and controlled by the city rather than by 
a cooperative of private homeowners susceptible to the blandishments of 
private property with its rejection of socialist values. The additional costs 
of extending an infrastructure of water, sewers and roads toward the out-
skirts of town made the option of large blocks closer to the center of town 
more attractive to the city, but the amount of available land was not a 
problem. The cheaper construction of settlement houses, however, made 
the costs per unit somewhat comparable, making the socialist values of 
the city administration the determining factor, it seems. It is easy to argue 
at this point that the possibility of a civil war also made higher concentra-
tions of potential fi ghters in reinforced concrete projects more attractive. 
The fi rst part of the settlement follows the pattern of others from the early 
1920’s, that is a series of row houses with large gardens behind them. The 
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second part along Simmeringer Hauptstrasse is a unique hybrid of a set-
tlement and a block. The whole tract would have been row houses, but the 
owners of the stretch along Simmeringer Hauptstrasse between Weissen-
böckstrasse and Reischekgasse were “causing trouble” when the project 
began, so the city could not acquire the land when the rest of the settle-
ment was built.* That left the area open for a different kind of develop-
ment in 1926-27 when the city bought the land and hired the private fi rm 
of Franz Kaym and Alfons Hetmanek as architects. The same team had 
designed the fi rst part of the settlement in 1923 so it was an easy choice 
to complete the project. Kaym, as mentioned earlier, had favored the set-
tlement concept in the early 1920’s but abandoned it after the movement 
met opposition and fi zzled by 1926. In the meantime he had ingratiated 
himself with the Stadtbauamt so that he was chosen as one of the mem-
bers of the jury for the Lassallehof. The fi rm had recently designed the 
Friedrich-Engels-Hof at Herderplatz and the nearby Karl-Höger-Hof in the 
XI. District.† 
With politically reliable residents in the adjacent settlement owned by the 
city Kaym and Hetmanek had an easier job than Karl Krist with his apart-
ment block at the entrance to the cooperative settlement at Josef Bau-
mann-Gasse 65-67. The size of the second part did not have to be espe-
cially large since Kaym and Hetmanek had only to complement the political 
sentiments found in the existing settlement rather than gerrymander an 
entire area. The location was signifi cant, for the importance of the junction 
* This document, following BD73/1924 is without a number and out of order in the carton. Check [ ] 
1924 dated January 23. The phrase is found in the document.
† Interestingly, the name of Hetmanek alone is to be found on a proposal for the new Palace of 
Justice after it burned in 1927. The design, accessible through the Architektur Zentrum Wien, is 
historicist to the point where it could have been taken from Palladio’s Four Books of Architecture.
Figure 11. Weissenböckstrasse II. Teil. taken from Simmeringer Hauptstrasse.
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of Weissenböckstrasse and Simmeringer Hauptstrasse had been apparent 
for some time.
The raid on the Arsenal in 1927 that prompted the distribution of arms to 
the Gemeindebauten apparently did not affect the plans for the addition 
to the settlement judging from dates on the drawings, for there were no 
Figure 12. Weissenböckstrasse II. Teil. taken from Simmeringer Hauptstrasse.
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changes in the design of 1926.* In other words the junction of Simmering-
er Hauptstrasse and Weissenböckstrasse was important enough in itself to 
warrant the structure that appeared. All the same, it stands out as one of 
the most provocative of the smaller buildings in the program. The base-
ment walls were of solid concrete (Massivmauerwerk) 51cm thick (1.67 
feet) for a building only two stories in height for the most part while the 
walls above ground were 38cm. thick (15 inches).† The walls are enough 
* Plans were approved by the Gemeinderat on Sept 24, 1926 and work started on October 29, 
1926. Information found at Bezirksamt Simmering 11.Bezirk Wien, Enkplatz. MA 37 Baupolizei. 
Folder Nur:E.Z. 2320-2321. Signed by Abteilungsvorstand of MA 15 but signature unreadable. Nr. 
40/21461/1926 signed by Abteilungsvorstand on 27 January, 1927. Put into the Stadtplan Blatt 
IX/8, 1928 Mag Abt. 54. It was fi nished on June 27, 1928. Schlöss Catalogue p.12. This project 
involved cooperation between MA 15 and MA 40 but for some reason MA 22 is not mentioned in the 
plans on fi le with the Baupolizei.
† Once the Depression hit the importance of reducing costs arose. One proposal was to reduce the 
strength of the walls (Verringerung der Mauerstärken) as well as to eliminate the attic windows 
known as Kämpferfenster. It should be noted immediately, however, that the word Kämpferfenster 
was an old term that referred originally to the support for a lintel or doorway arch where a window 
might be placed and did not refer to a feature specifi c to the Gemeindebauten. The term “Kämpfer” 
has more to do with the abacus of a classical column in architecture (Abakus in German) than with 
the word for “fi ghter.” Cf. BD 1232/31 from January, 1931 and especially BD 1293/31 recording a 
high level meeting of April 20, 1931. Regarding the strength of the walls, the committee admitted 
they were expensive and decided to set up a subcommittee.
Figure 13. Weissenböckstrasse II. Teil. taken from Simmeringer Hauptstrasse.
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to stop a bullet, but more striking are the corner windows on every fl oor 
ventilating the toilet cubicles that cut off the corners together with a simi-
lar window in the courtyard facing the entrance on Reischekgasse. Among 
the toilet ventilation windows that generated such opposition since 1926 
these stand out. They are outlined in solid masonry that appears to be cast 
stone or concrete surrounded by brick and look like casemated portals for 
fi ring weapons similar to bunkers in WW I. The corners of the windows 
taper down changing the 45 degree angle back to the 90 degree angle of 
the corner. The appearance is all-important for the impression they make 
from the outside regardless of how accessible the apertures were from the 
inside. The pictures are especially dramatic. (Figures 11-14) 
After 1928 such windows began to disappear, most likely because of the 
expense but possibly because of the opposition they generated among 
observers. The task of ventilating the cubicles was gradually assumed by 
larger windows in the apartments, a point mentioned in answering a com-
plaint about the small windows in 1938 well after the socialist program 
had ended.* In the meantime they made a signifi cant contribution to the 
Stadtbild and to this day remain to characterize the Gemeindebauten of 
the mid-1920’s.
* BD 172/1938 January 4, 1938. “Auch heute werden in den Wohnhäusern der Gemeinde Wien die 
Aborte von kleinen Wohnungen in gleicher Weise vorgesehen nur dass die Entläftungen derselben in 
letzter Zeit meistens in Oberlichtfl ügeln von normalen Fenstern untergebrach werden.”
Figure 14. Weissenböckstrasse II. Teil. taken from Simmeringer Hauptstrasse.
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The location and design of Weissenböckstrasse II.Teil attracted the at-
tention of the Schutzbund and the government alike. The socialists be-
gan concealing weapons there, possibly with the help of Franz Rzehak, a 
member of the City Council from Simmering and chairman of the District 
Housing Commission, who was arrested in February, 1934.* The martial 
aspect of the building with the ventilation windows looking strikingly like 
machinegun apertures made it an obvious candidate for a raid when the 
government began its systematic search for weapons. On May 14, 1933, 
the police raided the apartments of three streetcar drivers in the complex 
confi scating a large number of rifl es, machineguns and ammunition. In one 
apartment an unspecifi ed number of rifl es, seven carbines, ammunition 
and paraphernalia turned up, in another two machineguns, thirty rifl es, 
eleven boxes of machinegun ammunition and around a thousand rounds of 
rifl e ammunition were found. The police found three machinegun “bolts” in 
the third along with belts and ammunition as well as fi fty rifl es and ammu-
nition. The residents were given jail terms of seven, fourteen and ten days 
respectively, a slap on the wrist not unusual at the time because of the 
delicate relations between the government and the Schutzbund.† A similar 
raid in distant Linz became the spark that ignited the uprising in Vienna af-
ter the government started arresting neighborhood leaders, the Vertrauen-
smänner of various housing projects, who presumably knew where weap-
ons were stored and would lead the local Schutzbund units in the event of 
an uprising.
Conclusion
Well after Anton Weber and the Stadtbauamt backed away from including 
overtly military features in municipal housing projects the effects had not 
yet played out. The monument of the Reumannhof became the fortress of 
1934 along with many others when a general strike was called, the elec-
tricity and gas works were occupied and fi ring erupted from the windows 
of the projects. The metaphor of power became the reality of the bunker 
under the pressure of circumstances despite second thoughts among pol-
iticians and building designers chosen by the city. Massive concrete and 
brick structures, with or without military features, dotted the city, giving 
confi dence to socialist military leaders that they could defeat the govern-
ment with the limited forces at its disposal. By that time enough Social 
Democratic effort had gone into preparing for a civil war that there was no 
turning back. The gradual nature of the buildup to civil war in the years 
between 1924 and 1934, marked by the riots of 1927 and the fi ghting 
around the projects at the end of the decade, should alert a historian of 
the housing program to the connection between the architecture of the Ge-
* Lexikon der Wiener Sozialdemokratie. No records can be found regarding meetings of the District 
Housing Commission.
† AVA Polizeidirektion Wien, Akten Feb. 1934 Karton 5. Report dated 19 May, 1934 but listing the 
date of the search as 14.IV.33. The arrested were Josef Niedermayer, Leopold Schweitzer and Karl 
Haindl.
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meindebauten and the atmosphere of violence, easily forgotten after the 
failure in 1934 and the overwhelming distraction of the Nazi years, amid 
admiration for the social accomplishments of Red Vienna. Between 1924 
and roughly 1929 the city constructed buildings that were provocative in 
the extreme, and as their number mounted into the hundreds, the confi -
dence of the socialists in their reinforced masonry grew until the buildings 
became identifi ed with resistance and defi ance when the number of apart-
ments passed 60,000.* The seduction of the workers was complete by 
1934. A combination of Marxist propaganda, weapons, strongholds, prece-
dents ranging from the Paris Commune to the Bolshevik victory in Russia, 
and Schutzbund plans to attack, however pathetic the Eifl er Plan seems in 
retrospect, weaken the common argument that the uprising of 1934 was 
an act of despair with inevitable consequences when artillery was used 
against it. The prominence of the hard-line politician Anton Weber leading 
the housing program balanced the irresolution of other Social Democratic 
leaders who were retreating from the revolutionary aspects of the class 
struggle, Marxist though they claimed to be, and took physical form in the 
Gemeindebauten to transform the Stadtbild of Vienna into a city of work-
ers’ Kasernen. The place of the projects in the whole picture is important 
enough to make them an integral part of the tragic politics of Red Vien-
na and should be acknowledged when describing a type of the Gemeinde 
Wien apartment houses between the wars. To ignore the military qualities, 
apparent by simply looking at the buildings and how they fi t into the city-
scape, would be unfaithful to the past. The Stadtbauamt was not simply an 
offi ce populated by technocrats, it was fully engaged designing buildings 
in close cooperation with political leaders and a vision of the new socialist 
city, buying the property needed and choosing architects who would car-
ry out the mission. The activities of its own architects and fi rms trusted 
to follow their example, the awarding of contracts, and the buildings that 
resulted when private architects were engaged, point to a high degree of 
control by the Stadtbauamt while the political and social program of the 
Social Democratic Party exercised ultimate power to direct activities in 
the end. Anton Weber and the Stadtbauamt got the results they wanted, 
fully aware of the individual projects and their place in the Stadtbild, not 
somehow surprised and able to accuse critics of partisan politics for seeing 
something that was not there or unintended. It is easy to explain the lack 
of a paper trail. Built to last for two centuries, the buildings are still there 
to see. They have been renovated with many apartments enlarged to ac-
commodate higher standards of living but can still be seen in their context 
and understood as a contribution to the political turmoil that characterized 
Red Vienna.
 
* Actually 64,000 by 1934.
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